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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, government officials, legislators, industry execu-
tives, and academic commentators have all raised questions about ex-
cesses of the patent system, particularly with respect to damage awards.
In 2003, the Federal Trade Commission issued a broad report on sug-
gested patent reforms, noting the negative economic effects of overva-
lued patents: "Poor patent quality and legal standards and procedures
that inadvertently may have anticompetitive effects can cause unwar-
ranted market power and can unjustifiably increase costs."1 In the
years following this report, Congress has drafted, but not yet passed,
patent reform bills modifying postgrant opposition procedures, in-
creasing funding for the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to
improve patent prosecution, revising the standard for willful infringe-
ment, and addressing other patent system issues.2 Proposed legislation
further includes a requirement that the PTO conduct a study of rea-
sonable royalty damages, looking for patterns of "excessive and ine-
quitable damage awards," but not suggesting any immediate reforms
on this issue.' Technology industry executives, in particular, have sup-
ported patent reform legislation and publicly questioned the current
system's large damage awards.' Legislative and industry reformers
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1 Federal Trade Commission, To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of Competition
and Patent Law and Policy 5 (Oct 2003), online at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf
(visited Aug 29,2008).
2 See generally Patent Reform Act of 2007, HR 1908, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Sept 10, 2007).
3 Patent Reform Act of 2007 at § 19 (cited in note 2). The Act contains a statutory modifi-
cation with respect to reasonable royalties: "The court shall conduct an analysis to ensure that a
reasonable royalty ... is applied only to that economic value properly attributable to the patent's
specific contribution over the prior art." Id at § 5(b)(2). However, it is unclear how much of a
change this would represent over the existing reasonable royalty factors considered by courts.
See Part I.C.
4 See, for example, Greg Hitt, Industries Brace for Tough Battle over Patent Law: Drug Mak-
ers Oppose Overhaul Plan Backed by Tech, Finance Firms, Wall St J Al (June 6,2007) (quoting the
general counsel of Cisco Systems as saying that the "current patent system has encouraged 'lottery
ticket' litigation and deterred innovation"). Industry commentators agree. See, for example, Edi-
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draw support from academic commentary criticizing court-determined
reasonable royalty rates as overcompensating patent holders Despite
some court-initiated reform on patent remedies,' courts appear hesi-
tant to reform reasonable royalty damages.
Reasonable royalty damage awards derive from 35 USC § 284,
which provides that awards must be "adequate to compensate for the
infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use
made of the invention by the infringer."7 Since 1965, federal courts have
followed a fifteen-factor reasonable royalty analysis laid out in Geor-
gia-Pacific Corp v US Plywood Corp,' compiled from earlier patent
infringement cases.
Patent infringement suits present special concerns that can cloud
reasonable royalty determinations under Georgia-Pacific. A patent
infringement suit may be complicated by the availability of a nonin-
fringing alternative"- an alternate technology or process that per-
forms the same function as the infringing portion within the product
but does not fall within the claims of the patent- or patents-in-suit. The
Georgia-Pacific factors, however, do not directly address noninfringing
alternatives, resulting in potential overcompensation of the patent
holder. The most elaborate discussion of the importance of nonin-
fringing alternatives on reasonable royalty analysis came in Grain
Processing Corp v American Maize-Products Co," where the district
torial, Patently Absurd, Wall St J A14 (Mar 1, 2006) ("U.S. patent law has been hijacked so that it
now operates nearly in reverse, deterring research and penalizing innovation.").
5 See Mark A. Lemley and Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 Tex L
Rev 1991, 2020-25 (2007) (giving particular attention to practical difficulties with court royalty
calculations in cases involving combination products that "tend to drive royalty rates up"). See
also Amy L. Landers, Let the Games Begin: Incentives to Innovation in the New Economy of
Intellectual Property Law, 46 Santa Clara L Rev 307,335-40 (2006); Vincent O'Brien, Economics
and Key Patent Damages Cases, 9 U Bait Intell Prop L J 1, 3 (2000).
6 The Supreme Court recently carved back the Federal Circuit's policy of near-automatic
injunctions in infringement suits. See MercExchange, LLC v eBay, Inc, 547 US 388, 393-94
(2006). The Federal Circuit itself significantly raised the bar for plaintiffs attempting to establish
willful infringement. See In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F3d 1360, 1371 (Fed Cir 2007)
("[T]o establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted in-
fringement of a valid patent."). The prior willfulness doctrine was akin to a negligence standard.
In re Seagate now requires "a showing of objective recklessness" on the part of the infringer,
rather than mere negligence. Id.
7 35 USC § 284 (2000). See also Part I.A for discussion of this statutory language.
8 318 F Supp 1116 (SDNY 1965).
9 See id at 1120.
10 This concept is also referred to in case law as a "noninfringing substitute." See, for example,
Wechsler v Macke International Trade, lnc, 486 F3d 1286,1298 (Fed Cir 2007).
11 893 F Supp 1386 (ND Ind 1995) ("Grain Processing VI"), reversed, 1997 WL 71726 (Fed
Cir) ("Grain Processing VIP'), judgment entered at 979 F Supp 1233 (ND Ind 1997) ("Grain
Processing VIII"), affirmed, 185 F3d 1341 (Fed Cir 1999) ("Grain Processing IX"). Multiple
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court found that the existence of noninfringing substitutes could pro-
vide an effective cap on a reasonable royalty.'2
While Grain Processing suggests that the presence of noninfring-
ing alternatives provides a damages ceiling, the Federal Circuit has
elsewhere indicated that a reasonable royalty serves as a damages
floor." The court in Grain Processing was able to duck the problem of
collision between floor and ceiling because the noninfringing alterna-
tive was more expensive than the infringing method, ineaning a cap
would still permit a somewhat substantial royalty.' The Federal Circuit's
subsequent unclear stand on the implications of Grain Processing has
left district courts reluctant to use Grain Processing's cap on reasona-
ble royalty damages.
This Comment seeks to examine a narrow issue raised by Grain
Processing: when a noninfringing alternative to a patented invention is
available, with a minimal cost difference from the patented invention,
does the patent damage statute permit or even require an award of
nominal damages based on this minimal cost difference? In other
words, what happens when Grain Processing's reasonable-royalty ceil-
ing falls through the Federal Circuit's reasonable-royalty floor? While
many Grain Processing cases avoid this question, courts should con-
front this issue before deciding whether Grain Processing should be
widely applied (as the Federal Circuit has weakly suggested) or should
be cabined by continued use of Georgia-Pacific (as district court cases
have done).
To that end, Part I discusses reasonable royalty damages and the
statutory and case law basis for nominal damages, examining Georgia-
Pacific and cases that preceded and followed it. Part II discusses the
implications of Grain Processing for reasonable royalty aalySsan
examines the uncertainty that has followed in district courts as well as
in the Federal Circuit. Part III suggests that courts should embrace
Grain Processing's reasoning in cases of infringement in the presence
of noninfringing alternatives and considers how issues of deterrence
and willful infringement are affected by this choice of a legal rule.
Grain Processing opinions are referenced in this Comment; I have followed the numbering scheme
used by the Federal Circuit in Grain Processing IX.
12 See Grain Processing VI, 893 F Supp at 1392 (observing that such a cap could be based
on the cost difference between the patented invention and the noninfringing alternative).
13 See Trans-World Manufacturing Corp v Al Nyman & Sons, Inc, 750 F2d 1552, 1568 (Fed
Cir 1984).
14 See Grain Processing VI, 893 F Supp at 1392-93 (noting expert testimony on a cost differ-
ence of 2.3 percent, and setting a 3 percent reasonable royalty to account for uncertainty in tempor-
al variance in costs as well as to account for the hypothetical amount that the infringer would have
paid to avoid the risk of litigation). The resulting award exceeded $2.4 million. See id at 1397.
15 I use this term to refer to cases involving reasonable royalty calculations in the presence
of available, noninfringing alternatives.
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I. REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES
A. Statutory Basis
The patent damage statute, 35 USC § 284, provides for damages
in infringement suits as follows: "Upon finding for the claimant the
court shall award the claimant damages adequate to compensate for
the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the
use made of the invention by the infringer.'1 The word "reasonable"
suggests an objective analysis, which might exclude, for example, the
patent licensing policies of a particular patentee. In contrast, the statu-
tory phrase "damages adequate to compensate for infringement" sug-
gests a subjective inquiry, directing courts to examine the actual injury
suffered by this patentee as a result of the infringement. Courts recon-
cile these two clauses of the statute by interpreting them as alternative
bases for recovery: (1) lost profits, as compensation for a provable
injury suffered by the patentee; and (2) a reasonable royalty, when no
provable injury exists.'7 Accordingly, when plaintiffs have difficulty
proving lost profits, they seek to recover reasonable royalty damages.
The statute leaves wide discretion to courts to enhance damages, al-
lowing them to "increase the damages up to three times the amount
found or assessed."'.. Any such damage enhancements have generally
followed the doctrine of willful infringement- that is, when the in-
fringer knew her actions were highly likely to infringe the patent in
question, yet infringed nonetheless. 9 The statute further provides that
the court, when making reasonable royalty determinations, may be
assisted by experts.2°
The patent statutes' definition of infringement suggests that the
function of a reasonable royalty damage award is to cure the unautho-
rized use of the patented technology. Infringement occurs when a party
"makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention" and does
16 35 USC § 284 (emphasis added). The reasonable royalty language first appeared in the
patent statutes in 1946: "[C]omplainant shall be entitled to recover general damages which shall
be due compensation for making, using, or selling the invention, not less than a reasonable royal-
ty therefor." An Act to Amend Revised Statutes, 4921 (U.S.C.A., Title 35, Patents, Sec. 70) Pro-
viding that Damages Be Ascertained on the Basis of Compensation for Infringement, Pub L No
79-587, 60 Stat 778 (1946), originally codified at 35 USC § 70. The current language reflects revi-
sions made in An Act to Revise and Codify the Laws Relating to Patents and the Patent Office
and to Enact into Law Title 35 of the United States Code Entitled "Patents," Pub L No 82-593,
66 Stat 792,813 (1952), codified at 35 USC § 284 (2000).
17 See, for example, Grain Processing Corp v American Maize-Products Co, 893 F Supp
1386, 1389 (ND Ind 1995) ("Grain Processing VI') ("An aggrieved patent holder thus receives
the greater of lost profits or a reasonable royalty.").
18 35 USC § 284.
19 See note 6.
20 35 USC § 284.
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so "without authority.''2' Accordingly, a reasonable royalty compen-
sates for infringement when it corresponds to the amount needed to
obtain consent for authorized use by the infringer.
B. Before Georgia-Pacific
Explicit "reasonable royalty" language made its way into the pa-
tent statutes only after federal courts had applied this language for
decades. Federal courts viewed a reasonable royalty as a sound basis
for a determination of damages for infringement, particularly in the
absence of data on lost profits:
The plaintiff was clearly entitled to damages for the infringe-
ment. If there had been an established royalty, the jury could
have taken that sum as the measure of damages. In the absence
of such royalty, and in the absence of proof of lost sales or injury
by competition, the only measure of damages was such sum as,
under all the circumstances, would have been a reasonable royal-
ty for the defendant to have paid."
Early patent cases used reasonable royalty theory to limit damages for
the patentee. For example, the Seventh Circuit in 1911 affirmed an
award of nominal damages where the infringer only achieved a mod-
est efficiency gain.n
Just prior to the rise of Georgia-Pacific, the Supreme Court itself
took the position that patent holders are not necessarily entitled to
damage awards in all cases. In Aro Manufacturing Co, Inc v Converti-
ble Top Replacement Co, Inc,"4 the Court noted that § 284 damages are
intended to address "the difference between [the patentee's] pecu-
niary condition after the infringement, and what his condition would
have been if the infringement had not occurred. '"" In that case, the
Court found it clear from the statutory language that "the statute al-
lows the award of a reasonable royalty, or of any other recovery, only
if such amount constitutes 'damages' for the infringement."2 6 Thus in Aro
21 35 USC § 271(a) (2000).
22 Dowagiac Manufacturing Co v Minnesota Moline Plow Co, 235 US 641, 649 (1915),
quoting Hunt v Cassiday, 64 F 585,587 (9th Cir 1894).
23 See Columbia Wire Co v Kokomo Steel & Wire Co, 194 F 108, 110 (7th Cir 1911) (arguing
that awarding greater damages would "attribute to the patent a virtue it did not really have").
See also Horvath v McCord Radiator & Manufacturing Co, 100 F2d 326, 335 (6th Cir 1938) ("In
fixing damages on a royalty basis against an infringer, the sum allowed should be reasonable and
that which would be accepted by a prudent licensee who wished to obtain a license but was not
so compelled and a prudent patentee, who wished to grant a license but was not so compelled.").
24 377 US 476 (1964).
25 Id at 507, quoting Yale Lock Manufacturing Co v Sargent, 117 US 536,552 (1886).
26 Aro, 377 US at 505 (emphasis added).
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the Supreme Court clearly articulated that reasonable royalties are
recoverable only as "damages," again construing this term strictly
against patentees.
C. The Georgia-Pacific Factors
In the context of this mix of statute and precedent, federal courts
embraced the fifteen-factor test compiled in Georgia-Pacific for deter-
mining reasonable royalties." By purporting to summarize and combine
prior case law, Georgia-Pacific effectively replaced the analysis of ear-
lier cases with a set of factors to balance. Courts following Georgia-
Pacific have adopted its test in spite of the fact that the Georgia-Pacific
court itself hardly suggested that it was proposing a complete or suffi-
ciently general set of factors applicable to all other cases.
The court in Georgia-Pacific identified fifteen factors for consid-
eration, without grouping or otherwise organizing the suggested con-
siderations. The varied forms of inquiry-both objective and subjec-
tive- are better understood by considering groups of factors together.
One group of factors weighs the value of the patented invention.
The eighth" and ninth factors look to the objective value of the pa-
tent as evidenced by the market and by comparisons to other prod-
ucts. The sixth" and tenth32 factors consider the subjective perspective
of the patentee, looking at the value of the particular commercial em-
bodiment that the patentee has pursued and its role within the paten-
tee's product lines. The eleventh factor 3 switches perspectives, examin-
ing the value of the patented technology to the infringer. The thirteenth
27 318 F Supp at 1120.
28 The court introduced the factors rather tentatively: "The following are some of the
factors mutatis mutandis seemingly more pertinent to the issue herein." Id. The use of the Latin
phrase mutatis mutandis ("the necessary changes having been made") strongly suggests to future
readers that this particular list in its form may not be suitable or appropriate for application in
future cases.
29 "The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its commercial
success; and its current popularity." Id.
30 "The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any,
that had been used for working out similar results" Id.
31 "The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the
licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-
patented items; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales." Georgia-Pacific, 318 F Supp
at 1120.
32 "The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of
it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the inven-
tion." Id.
33 "The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any evidence
probative of the value of that use." Id.
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2008] Nominal Reasonable Royalties for Patent Infringement
factor" considers a special case of value to an infringer, where the pa-
tented invention only constitutes a portion of the product as sold and
may not constitute a significant portion of the product's value.
A second group of factors considers a reasonable royalty as a
proxy for a license. The first,35 second,36 and fourth 7 factors are subjec-
tive inquiries into the prior patent licensing activities of the patentee
and the infringing party, including a consideration of whether the pa-
tentee had ever decided to license the patent at all. The twelfth factor"
makes an objective licensing inquiry, looking to the customary policies
of the particular relevant industry. The third39 and seventh' Georgia-
Pacific factors address the hypothetical scope and duration of the li-
cense for which the reasonable royalty is being calculated. Finally, the
fifteenth Georgia-Pacific factor directs courts to conduct a hypotheti-
cal licensing negotiation between the parties:
The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the
infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily
trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount which a prudent
licensee-who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a li-
cense to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the
patented invention-would have been willing to pay as a royalty
and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and which amount
would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was will-
ing to grant a license."
This hypothetical negotiation is objective, as it takes place between
hypothetical parties positioned like the patentee and infringer, but not
34 "The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distin-
guished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant
features or improvements added by the infringer." Id.
35 "The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or
tending to prove an established royalty." Georgia-Pacific, 318 F Supp at 1120.
36 "The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in
suit." Id.
37 "The licensor's established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent mono-
poly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special conditions
designed to preserve that monopoly." Id.
38 "The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular
business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inven-
tions." Id. It is ambiguous as to which "particular business" is the appropriate venue for inquiry-
that of the patentee or of the infringer, which may not be the same.
39 "The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as restricted or
non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may be
sold." Georgia-Pacific, 318 F Supp at 1120.
4 "The duration of the patent and the term of the license." Id.
41 Id.
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the parties themselves. However, as noted above, several of the pre-
vious Georgia-Pacific factors direct courts to examine these same con-
siderations from the perspective of the parties, who may not be behav-
ing "reasonably and voluntarily.
'42
Two Georgia-Pacific factors stand apart from these groupings. The
fourteenth factor 3 simply allows for expert testimony supporting the
other factors. The fifth factor" considers the competitive position of
the patentee and infringer. Because lost profits can generally be re-
covered when the patentee and infringer are competitors, it is unclear
why this analysis should be part of a reasonable royalty calculation,
which is performed as an alternative when lost profits are unavailable
or too difficult to prove.
D. The Impact of Georgia-Pacific
1. The Georgia-Pacific factors and a "reasonable" royalty.
Georgia-Pacific offers a broad set of factors that combine objec-
tive inquiries into the value of the patent with subjective inquiries into
the use of the patent by both the patentee and infringer, as well as the
relevant licensing activities of the parties. Because the use of the term
"reasonable" in the statute suggests that an objective "reasonable per-
son" standard should be applied to reasonable royalty calculations, it
is unclear whether the Georgia-Pacific court erred in including subjec-
tive, party-specific inquiries in its calculus.
Not all subjective Georgia-Pacific factors are necessarily in con-
flict with the "reasonable person" standard suggested by the statute.
The eleventh (and to some extent, the thirteenth) factor looks at how
the particular infringing party has used the patented invention. 5 The
infringer may be utilizing the patented invention in a manner nearly
identical to the patentee's use, or the infringer's product may only fall
under the claims of the patent in a peripheral and non-essential way.
This use clearly impacts the royalty that a reasonable person in the
infringer's position would be willing to pay, and examining these parti-
cularities of the parties' conduct seems appropriate.
42 Id. Specifically, the fourth factor (the licensing policy of the patentee), the sixth and
tenth factors (the value and use of the patented invention by the patentee), and the eleventh
factor (the value of the patented invention to the infringing party) would seem to influence
heavily an actual negotiation.
43 "The opinion testimony of qualified experts." Georgia-Pacific, 318 F Supp at 1120.
44 "The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they
are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether they are inventor
and promoter." Id.
45 See id.
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However, the fourth factor's subjective consideration of the paten-
tee's licensing policy, or lack thereof, could result in a computation of
a less-than-reasonable royalty. If the court is performing a reasonable
royalty analysis, the patentee and infringer are likely not directly
aligned competitors (or else lost profits would be recoverable). Accor-
dingly, a reasonable, profit-maximizing patentee may well license the
patent to a noncompetitor to deploy technology covered by the claims
of the patent in a noncompeting market. If, however, this particular
patentee has never licensed the patent in this manner, this inquiry will
cut the wrong way, increasing the size of a reasonable royalty award
but making it less reasonable.
Patent infringement consists of the use of a patented technology
without the consent of the patent holder.6' Georgia-Pacific's factors,
however, require courts to inquire into the cost of obtaining consent,
both from the actual patentee and a fictitious, objective person. Due
to this combination of objective and subjective factors, adherence to
Georgia-Pacific's list pulls courts in multiple directions, especially when
confronting infringement in the presence of noninfringing alternatives.
2. The Georgia-Pacific factors and noninfringing alternatives.
In a case where noninfringing alternatives are alleged to be avail-
able, certain Georgia-Pacific factors appear particularly relevant. Fac-
tual investigation under the first factor (licensing royalties actually
received by the patentee) could reveal circumstantial evidence of the
availability of acceptable noninfringing alternatives. If the patent has
been licensed successfully, it seems unlikely that noninfringing alterna-
tives are readily available at comparable cost, or licensees would have
adopted those alternatives. However, this may not be the case if the
patented product is not being used by the infringer in the same way as
it has been used by the patentee's existing licensees."
Consideration of the ninth factor (the advantages of the patented
invention over previous methods for obtaining the same result) may
amount to consideration of noninfringing alternatives, although the
Georgia-Pacific court only mentions "old modes or devices."' According-
ly, this factor does not seem to cover alternatives developed after the fil-
ing of the patent but before the period of infringement. Analysis under
the ninth factor may also indicate why-other than for economic rea-
46 See Part I.A. See also 35 USC § 271(a).
47 See, for example, Grain Processing VI, 893 F Supp at 1390. The customers of the infring-
ing party in Grain Processing did not actually need their product to have the particular descrip-
tive ratio of saccharides that was present in the patented product-that ratio was not an impor-
tant commercial attribute of the infringing party's product.
48 Georgia-Pacific, 318 F Supp at 1120.
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sons-the infringer adopted the patented invention and whether such use
is itself evidence that no acceptable substitutes were actually available.
Finally, the presence of noninfringing alternatives would seem to
have a heavy influence on the fifteenth factor -the hypothetical nego-
tiation. When noninfringing alternatives are available, the cost in-
crease (if any) incurred by using the alternative instead of the pa-
tented technology effectively caps the value of the patentee's offer of
a license to this infringer. If the product or process the infringer seeks
to implement can be achieved without use of the patented product
and at a lower cost than the offered license, the hypothetical negotia-
tion will push the license cost down to the cost of the available nonin-
fringing alternative.
II. REASONABLE ROYALTIES AND GRAIN PROCESSING
Georgia-Pacific's set of reasonable royalty factors provides no
specific guidance for courts confronting noninfringing alternatives.
While the Federal Circuit has acknowledged the relevance of nonin-
fringing alternatives in reasonable royalty calculations,'9 it has yet to
clarify the extent to which available alternatives may reduce damages
for infringement.
A. The Grain Processing Opinions
The clearest exposition of the significance of available nonin-
fringing alternatives came through a series of district court opinions
by Seventh Circuit Judge Frank Easterbrook (sitting by designation in
the Northern District of Indiana) in Grain Processing Corp v Ameri-
can Maize-Products Co." The plaintiff in Grain Processing sought lost
profits and, in the alternative, reasonable royalties from a defendant
whose food products infringed the plaintiffs malto-dextrin patent."
Following a finding of infringement in the course of litigation, the de-
fendant company adopted an alternative process, yielding a nonin-
fringing final product.52 Judge Easterbrook found that the noninfring-
ing process could have been used by the infringer for the entire period
of time following the assignment of the patent to the plaintiff, a de-
49 See, for example, Zygo Corp v Wyko Corp, 79 F3d 1563, 1571-72 (Fed Cir 1996) (remand-
ing for recalculation of reasonable royalty damages because the defendant "would have been in
a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it had a competitive noninfring-
ing device 'in the wings"').
50 893 F Supp 1386 (ND Ind 1995) ("Grain Processing VI'), reversed, 1997 WL 71726 (Fed
Cir) ("Grain Processing VII"), judgment entered at 979 F Supp 1233 (ND Ind 1997) ("Grain
Processing VIII"), affirmed, 185 F3d 1341 (Fed Cir 1999) ("Grain Processing IX").
51 See Grain Processing VI, 893 F Supp at 1389.
52 See id.
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termination that "scotch[ed] [the plaintiffs] request for lost-profits
damages."5 The infringing party would have been able "to offer per-
fectly lawful competition" because a noninfringing process could have
been used, and the plaintiff was thus unable to recover lost profits.S
Judge Easterbrook then proceeded to a reasonable royalty analy-
sis. The alternative noninfringing process was available but would
have been more expensive to implement than the infringing process.55
Judge Easterbrook first considered the cost difference between the
infringing and noninfringing processes (approximately 2.3 percent) as
a basis-in fact, the sole basis-for a reasonable royalty: "[T]he only
[costs] relevant to this case are the incremental costs of avoiding in-
fringement."'" However, due to uncertainties in the variation of this cost
difference across the entire period of infringement, 7 Judge Easterbrook
instead adopted a royalty of 3 percent of the defendant's sales.8
While the reasonable royalty award in Grain Processing was not
challenged on appeal, 9 the Federal Circuit nevertheless addressed the
53 See id at 1392. The patent was assigned to the plaintiff by a third party, but no right to
recover damages for pre-assignment infringement was transferred. See id at 1391. Much of the
district court opinion concerns whether the noninfringing process was available during the rele-
vant period of time, as the infringing party did not actually implement the process until much
later. See id at 1389-92. The court stated that it need not decide whether the defendant "could
have employed the [noninfringing] dual-enzyme process from the get-go" because, by the time of
the assignment of the patent, the court was "confident" that defendant could have implemented
the noninfringing process. Id at 1391.
54 Id at 1392. See also Grain Processing VIII, 979 F Supp at 1236 ("A product that is within
a firm's existing production abilities but not on the market ... effectively constrains the patent
holder's profits."); Panduit Corp v Stahlin Brothers Fibre Works Inc, 575 F2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir
.... 8) '....uiring that patenteeprove the "absence of acceptable noninfrinrin substitutes" in
order to recover lost profits).
55 See Grain Processing V1, 893 F Supp at 1392.
56 Id. Judge Easterbrook asked, "What, then, is the reasonable royalty to which [plaintiff] is
entitled?" and answered that the defendant's expert "calculated a cost difference approximating
2.3%." Id.
57 Judge Easterbrook suggested that but for these uncertainties, the reasonable royalty
would have been set by the cost difference: "Nonetheless, I hesitate to set the royalty at [defen-
dant expert's] figure for glucoamylase cost differences." Id.
58 Id at 1392-93. Note that the 3 percent royalty is computed from the defendant's sales
and bears no relation to the 2.3 percent cost difference between the processes. Judge Easter-
brook considered prior licenses issued by the patentee, customary industry licenses, and a hypo-
thetical negotiation (Georgia-Pacific factors one, twelve, and fifteen) in reaching this number.
See id at 1393.
59 The plaintiffs appealed the district court's determination that the noninfringing alterna-
tive in question was actually available to the infringer for the relevant period. See Grain
Processing VII, 1997 WL 71726 at *1-2 (indicating that an alternative that the infringer "could
have developed [ ] sooner and that [ ] would have been a noninfringing substitute" could not be
considered an alternative that was "available or on the market"). Accordingly, the Federal Cir-
cuit remanded the case. See id at *1. On remand, Judge Easterbrook was forced to remind the
Federal Circuit of its own precedent for determining the availability of noninfringing substitutes.
See Grain Processing VIII, 979 F Supp at 1235 ("I am confident that the court of appeals did not
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issue of noninfringing alternatives and reasonable royalties. The Fed-
eral Circuit appeared to interpret Judge Easterbrook's reasonable
royalty rate as a modification of the 2.3 percent cost difference, not as
a separately determined percentage of net sales: "The district court
also found that [defendant's] production cost difference between in-
fringing and noninfringing Lo-Dex 10 effectively capped the reasona-
ble royalty award. ' The court resisted the plaintiff's contention that
such a damage award "ceiling" was somehow unfair: "[A]lthough [plain-
tiff] stresses that [defendant] should not reap the benefit of its 'choice'
to infringe rather than use the more expensive Process IV, [plaintiff]
does not allege willful infringement and the record shows none.' In the
absence of willful infringement, therefore, the Federal Circuit seemed
comfortable with a reasonable royalty ceiling based on an available
noninfringing alternative.
In the same opinion, however, the Federal Circuit also characterized
reasonable royalties as a floor for "damages adequate to compensate
for the infringement. 62 Under either characterization of a reasonable
royalty - whether the damage amount is a floor or a ceiling - the court
affirmed the view that "the statute specifically envisions a reasonable
royalty as a form of adequate compensation."6'
Grain Processing managed to dodge the sticky question of what
might happen when this floor and ceiling meet, squeezing out any
damage recovery. Judge Easterbrook ended up applying a combina-
tion of Georgia-Pacific factors to reach a reasonable royalty, but the
2.3 percent cost difference would have allowed for nonzero recovery
even if it had operated as a cap.' Essentially, the Grain Processing
decisions confirm what "availability" means for noninfringing substi-
tutes6' but do not decide whether such substitutes actually create a
damages ceiling. Notably, the Federal Circuit's restatement of the dis-
trict court's holding to this effect is at best dicta, not only because that
decision was not being reviewed by the Federal Circuit but because its
interpretation of exactly how the reasonable royalty was reached does
not appear to be correct.
mean to say that a particular product must be sold contemporaneously with the infringement to
count as an 'available' non-infringing substitute."). He again entered the same judgment. Id at 1238.
60 Grain Processing IX, 185 F3d at 1347. Note that this discussion of the reasonable royalty
award occurs in the Federal Circuit's second review of this issue.
61 Id at 1353.
62 Id at 1352.
63 Id.
64 See Grain Processing VI, 893 F Supp at 1392-93.
65 See Grain Processing IX, 185 F3d at 1356 ("[A]n acceptable substitute not on the mar-
ket during the infringement may nonetheless become part of the lost profits calculus and there-
fore limit or preclude those damages.").
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B. The Implications of Grain Processing
In Grain Processing, the available noninfringing alternative not
only played a role in determining a reasonable royalty but also sank
the plaintiff's lost profits claim. Grain Processing is most widely noted
for this lost profits result and for its construction of availability.' How-
ever, the less examined features of the decision raise a critical ques-
tion: what if the evidence had shown a noninfringing substitute availa-
ble at marginal (or even zero) additional cost to the infringer-might
this have precluded any damage award at all? The Federal Circuit
suggested an affirmative answer in its characterization of Judge Eas-
terbrook's reasonable royalty calculation as capped by the cost differ-
ence, without expressing any expression of concern as to how low this
damages ceiling could drop. Notably, the court did not require a signif-
icant damage award to meet the threshold of reasonableness. Nor did
the court suggest that other Georgia-Pacific factors should play a role in
enhancing an otherwise negligible royalty based on a cost difference.
Examination of the Federal Circuit's other opinions on nonin-
fringing alternatives, however, calls into question its endorsement of a
reasonable royalty damage ceiling that could fall so low. For example,
in Rite-Hite Corp v Kelley Co, Inc," Judge Helen Nies suggested that
§ 284 was not intended to support nominal damages: "A reasonable
royalty is in fact a Congressional largesse for cases where a patentee
might otherwise receive only nominal damages. A patentee is now
statutorily entitled to a reasonable royalty even though it has not suf-
fered or cannot prove a financial loss to its market in patented
goods.' Judge Nies provided a quotation from Congressman Frede-
66 See, for example, Bass Pro Trademarks, LLC v Cabela's, Inc, 2006 WL 120174, *1 (D Mo)
(noting that under Grain Processing, "[tihe presence of acceptable noninfringing substitutes may
preclude lost profit damages"); Honeywell International, Inc v Hamilton Sundstrand Corp, 166 F
Supp 2d 1008, 1029 (D Del 2001) (discussing the Grain Processing standard for availability of
alternatives not actually on the market during the time of infringement). See generally Mark
Chretien, Note, The Question of Availability: Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-Products
Co., 38 Hous L Rev 1489, 1492 (2002) (discussing the ramifications of the expansion of "availa-
bility" under Grain Processing); Margaret E.M. Utterback, Substitute This! A New Twist on Lost
Profits Damages in Patetit Infringement Suits: Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize-
Products Co., 2000 Wis L Rev 909,910 (noting that Grain Processing's construction of availabili-
ty created a "new hurdle to jump" for patentees attempting to recover lost profits).
67 56 F3d 1538 (Fed Cir 1995). While it precedes Grain Processing, the Rite-Hite decision
provides some of the broadest discussion of the issue. However, drawing firm conclusions about
the Federal Circuit's opinion from Rite-Hite is difficult to do. The case was decided en banc: six
judges fully joined the opinion of the court; four judges joined the opinion of the court as to one
particular part but filed a separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part; two other
judges joined the opinion of the court with respect to another part and filed their own separate
opinion dissenting in part and concurring in part.
68 Id at 1574 (Nies dissenting in part and concurring in part). Judge Pauline Newman pro-
vided a contrary view in her dissenting opinion, asserting (and following the Supreme Court in
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rick Lanham prior to the revision of the patent statute in support of
her argument against nominal damages, but Lanham's words seem to
cut the opposite way: "Of course, in a case of an innocent infringe-
ment, it is to be presumed that the court would assess no more than a
reasonable royalty for such time as the patent infringed by the inno-
cent user."69 While Congressman Lanham's "no more than a reasona-
ble royalty" language is inverted in the statute as adopted in 1952, in
which a patentee is entitled to "no less than a reasonable royalty,"7( his
language supports the notion that reasonable damage awards shrink-
ing to zero might comport with congressional intent.
1. The Federal Circuit has hesitated to embrace
Grain Processing.
The Federal Circuit has not explicitly adopted the district court's
reasoning in Grain Processing. In Micro Chemical, Inc v Lextron, Inc,"
the Federal Circuit backed away from Grain Processing's implications
for shrinking reasonable royalty damages, stating that it "has not had
occasion to address whether the holding of Grain Processing has ap-
plicability in the reasonable royalty context. We need not decide that
issue here." The "holding" the court refers to is that "a non-infringing
substitute not on the market during the time of infringement may nev-
ertheless have been 'available' for purposes of defeating a lost profits
claim." 3 While the court reasonably construes its Grain Processing
ruling as narrowly as possible, the reasonable royalty damage award
(which was affirmed by the Federal Circuit) was predicated on pre-
cisely the same reasoning: a noninfringing substitute not on the mar-
ket during the time of infringement was considered "available" for
purposes of capping a reasonable royalty award. It seems disinge-
nuous, therefore, for the court to question whether Grain Processing
"has applicability" to reasonable royalty calculations when that case
itself addressed the issue.
Although Micro Chemical suggests a retreat from the implications
of Grain Processing, the Federal Circuit appeared more amenable to its
application in a reasonable royalty setting in Riles v Shell Exploration
Aro) that "the purpose of the award of damages for patent infringement is to compensate the
claimant for the losses incurred." Id at 1580 (Newman dissenting in part and concurring in part).
69 Id at 1574 n 22 (Nies dissenting in part and concurring in part), quoting Patent In-
fringement Suits, 79th Cong, 2d Sess, in 92 Cong Rec 1857 (Mar 4, 1946) (Rep Lanham) (empha-
sis added).
70 An Act to Revise and Codify the Laws Relating to Patents § 284, 66 Stat at 813.
71 317 F3d 1387 (Fed Cir 2003).
72 Id at 1393.
73 Id.
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and Production Co.7' In Riles, the defendant argued that it could have
used a noninfringing alternative costing an additional $350,000 and that
this amount should cap damages under the reasoning articulated in
Grain Processing.75 However, the plaintiff-patentee argued that the
alleged alternative was not viable in the given conditions." The Feder-
al Circuit found the evidence on the alternative conflicting and re-
manded the case without stating directly whether the damages could
really be capped at $350,000 as the defendant alleged."
By implying that the defendant's damage-cap argument might suc-
ceed with additional factual support, Riles offers support for Grain
Processing's reasoning, but the Federal Circuit muddied any such con-
clusion by showing its continuing preference for the use of the Georgia-
Pacific factors when it admonished the plaintiffs expert for inadequate
consideration of the first Georgia-Pacific factor (the patentee's prior
licensing agreements)."8 While this could be viewed solely as a criticism
of the reasonable royalty analysis conducted at the district court level,
consideration of this subjective Georgia-Pacific factor may have been
irrelevant if the Riles court had fully embraced Grain Processing.9
The Federal Circuit's most recent statement on noninfringing al-
ternatives and reasonable royalties came in Mars, Inc v Coin Accep-
tors, Inc.'O The Federal Circuit found that no "available and acceptable
noninfringing alternative" actually existed at the time infringement
began, sinking the defendant's argument that reasonable royalty dam-
ages could be capped." However, in dicta following this holding, the
court suggested that the defendant's argument would fail anyway and
stated that the defendant was "wrong as a matter of law to claim that
reasonable royalty damages are capped at the cost of implementing
the cheapest available, acceptable, noninfringing alternative."' The
court stated, "We have previously considered and rejected such an
74 298 F3d 1302 (Fed Cir 2002). Judge Paul Michel, who joined the opinion of the court in
Micro Chemical, filed a dissenting opinion in Riles but disputes only the finding of infringement
itselt not the reasonable royalty analysis. See id at 1314 (Michel dissenting).
75 See id at 1313 (majority).
76 Id.
77 See id. The court vacated the $8.7 million jury award. See id at 1305, 1307.
78 See Riles, 298 F3d at 1313.
79 If an available, noninfringing alternative provides a cap on reasonable royalty damages,
the patentee's prior licensing policy would only seem relevant if the patentee had consistently
licensed the patent for less than that cap, depressing a reasonable royalty award even further.
Permitting a patentee's high licensing fees or a refusal to license at all to raise a damage award
above the cap makes the notion of a "cap" meaningless.
80 527 F3d 1359 (Fed Cir 2008).
81 Id at 1373.
82 Id.
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argument," citing Monsanto Co v Ralph" for the principle that reason-
able royalties can exceed a defendant's profit margin.4 Monsanto,
however, did not involve noninfringing alternatives, and the Mars
court made no reference to its prior rulings in Grain Processing and
Riles-cases that did involve noninfringing alternatives and supported
the Mars defendant's argument.
2. District courts have continued to apply Georgia-Pacific in
Grain Processing cases.
As the Federal Circuit sends mixed signals about Grain Processing
and reasonable royalties, several district courts continue to insist on
considering Georgia-Pacific factors, even when the presence of nonin-
fringing alternatives, coupled with Grain Processing's economic analy-
sis, argues against its influence. For example, in Schofield v United
States Steel Corp,a the Northern District of Indiana rebuffed the de-
fendant's invocation of a Grain Processing cost-difference argument,
stating that "[t]he other Georgia-Pacific factors should be considered
in making the reasonable royalty determination," even in the presence
of noninfringing alternatives." The court contended that noninfringing
alternatives were only part of the analysis, asserting that "[w]hile the
economic effects of noninfringing alternatives available to the infring-
er is a key factor in determining the reasonable royalty in the hypo-
thetical negotiation, it is not dispositive." Similarly, in Linear Tech
Corp v Micrel, Inc," the Northern District of California noted that "the
Federal Circuit has specifically declined to decide whether the Grain
Processing decision concerning the import of noninfringing alterna-
tives is applicable in the reasonable royalty context."9 The court de-
clined to adopt Grain Processing's implications, arguing that a cap on
the plaintiff's royalty damages "would frustrate the very purposes of
the patent damages statute which are to make the patentee whole." °
83 382 F3d 1374 (Fed Cir 2004).
84 See Mars, 527 F3d at 1373, citing Monsanto, 382 F3d at 1383.
85 2006 US Dist LEXIS 39605 (ND Ind).
86 Idat*21.
87 Id, citing Cardiac Pacemakers; Inc v St Jude Medical, Inc, 2002 WL 1801525, *72 (SD Ind).
Like the Federal Circuit, the Schofield court appeared to misunderstand the royalty calculation
in Grain Processing. "The district court found that it cost only 2.3% more to make non-infringing
products, and thus determined that when faced with a hypothetical offer to license the patent in
suit, the accused infringer would not have paid more than a 3% royalty rate, a number which
reflected the cost difference and other possible cost fluctuations." Schofield, 2006 US Dist
LEXIS 39605 at *17.
88 2006 US Dist LEXIS 96860 (ND Cal).
89 Id at *268.
90 Id. Notably, the court found that the defendant willfully infringed the patent. See id at *206.
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These district court cases demonstrate a need for clarity from the
Federal Circuit on this issue: Do all of the Georgia-Pacific factors still
apply in Grain Processing cases? Or does the presence of noninfring-
ing alternatives merit a strict Grain Processing analysis?
C. Commentary on Grain Processing, Georgia-Pacific, and
Reasonable Royalties
Some commentary seeks to reconcile Georgia-Pacific factors with
Grain Processing's economically based reasonable royalty analysis, ra-
ther than discard the factors as misleading. For example, Liane Peter-
son argues that "[miany of the Georgia-Pacific factors involve factual
inquiries that are compatible with the recently approved economic
methods of calculating damages."9' John Schlicher argues that broad
application is desirable, as Grain Processing is "likely to bring patent
damages more in line with economic reality."' Schlicher also notes
that "[ilf damages for patent infringement always exceed the econom-
ic value of patent rights, there will be too little licensing, and too much
litigation."9" From this perspective, the lower awards available to a pa-
tentee in the face of a reasonable royalty cap would encourage negotia-
tion and settlement in Grain Processing cases.
In contrast, other commentators argue that Grain Processing is a
serious problem for patent damage calculations, not part of a solution
toward more economically reasonable royalty calculations. Jerry Haus-
man, Gregory Leonard, and J. Gregory Sidak heavily criticize Grain
Processing's logic:
If a court finds the patent valid and infringed, the [defendant] can
argue under Grain Processing that it would have switched to the
noninfringing technology in the but-for world, thereby effectively
making the switch retroactively. Grain Processing thereby makes
the option essentially free. This option reduces the deterrent ef-
fect of litigation and therefore encourages infringement."
However, Hausman, Leonard, and Sidak make their "free option" ar-
gument in the setting of higher-cost noninfringing alternatives, and
91 Liane M. Peterson, Grain Processing and Crystal Semiconductor: Use of Economic Me-
thods in Damage Calculations Will Accurately Compensate for Patent Infringement, 13 Fed Cir B J
41, 70-71 (2003) ("Several of the [Georgia-Pacific] factors involve the same type of market re-
construction approach required in Grain Processing.").
92 John W Schlicher, Measuring Patent Damages by the Market Value of Inventions- The
Grain Processing, Rite-Hite, and Aro Rules, 82 J Patent & Trademark Off Socy 503,532-34 (2000).
93 Id.
94 Jerry A. Hausman, Gregory K. Leonard, and J. Gregory Sidak, Patent Damages and Real
Options: How Judicial Characterization of Noninfringing Alternatives Reduces Incentives to In-
novate, 22 Berkeley Tech L J 825,830-31 (2007) (emphasis omitted).
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their criticism may be better addressed by the doctrine of willful in-
fringement than by a rejection of Grain Processing." Ultimately, these
commentators conclude that Grain Processing "is at odds with stan-
dard economic theory."%
III. THE CASE FOR NOMINAL REASONABLE ROYALTY DAMAGES
This Part presents an example Grain Processing case with a non-
infringing alternative available at no additional cost, based on a recent
Federal Circuit appeal. Part III.A suggests that Grain Processing's
reasoning would support an award of only nominal reasonable royalty
damages in the case of the example. Part III.B outlines additional
support for this result, and Part III.C analyzes the impact of such a
result on litigation and settlement. Finally, Part III.D addresses criti-
cisms of Grain Processing's approach.
A. A Real World Example
To help give a framework for evaluating nominal reasonable royal-
ty damages, this Part tracks an example drawn from a 2005 Federal Cir-
cuit case, Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc v Graco Children's Products, Inc. "
Suppose that Company A manufactures a child car seat consisting of a
molded plastic base and a molded plastic seat, attached to the base
with a screw. The two pieces of the car seat, once assembled, are not
intended to be separated during use by the consumer. Company B
holds a patent on a child car seat consisting of a base and a seat that,
according to the claims of the patent, must be "removably attached"
to the base. Company B markets a car seat (an embodiment of this
patent) that allows parents to attach and remove the seat from the
base during normal use -the base may be left behind in a car while
the seat (and the child) may be carried around. Company B then sues
Company A for patent infringement, and the court finds that Compa-
ny A's seat is "removably attached" to the base because the screw
could be removed by a consumer. Accordingly, Company A is found to
infringe Company B's patent.9
95 If the infringer has indeed knowingly chosen to adopt a cheaper, patented technology
over a more costly, unpatented alternative, treble damages would be available under the doctrine
of willful infringement. See, for example, In re Seagate, 497 F3d at 1371. See also 35 USC § 284
("[T]he court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or assessed.").
96 Hausman, Leonard, and Sidak, 22 Berkeley Tech L J at 853 (cited in note 94).
97 429 F3d 1043 (Fed Cir 2005). The district court ruling focused only on claim construction
and contained few facts. See Dorel Juvenile Group, Inc v Graco Children's Products, 2004 WL
2269760 (SD Ind).
98 While such claim interpretation may sound implausible or even obviously erroneous,
this is precisely what occurred in Dorel. The district court concluded that the car seat did not
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In this case, Company A has not sought to replicate the patented
feature in its product, nor does it have any desire to do so -Company
A's car seat could just as easily have been designed with a rivet (in-
stead of a screw) permanently joining the two pieces for the same cost,
or the seat and base could have been one molded unit. In other words,
the value of the patented feature (seat and base being "removably
attached") to Company A is exactly zero, as is the cost difference of a
noninfringing rivet alternative. Following the guidance of Grain
Processing, this cost difference should cap any reasonable royalty
award, leading to a zero damage award for Company B in spite of a
finding of infringement.
B. Support for Nominal or Zero Reasonable Royalties
The focus of the patent damages statute is on infringement, not
on injustice, but the statute provides no explicit guidance on whether
zero damages could "compensate for infringement."' ' ° A reasonable
royalty award compensates for an unauthorized use, and should be
equivalent to the value that would have to be transferred in order to
obtain consent for this use. In the example, that value must be zero, as
Company A attributes no value to the patented invention and would
immediately adopt a noninfringing substitute. Again, the statute's key
provision is for a reasonable royalty. If "reasonable" equates to "objec-
tively rational" as it does elsewhere in the law,01 then zero damages
are supported by the statute precisely when that amount corresponds
to the value a rational potential infringer would be willing to transfer
to the patentee in order to obtain a license.
Because the reasonable royalty calculation is conducted only when
the patentee is unable to prove any actual injury (foreclosing a lost
profits recovery), a transfer from the infringing party (who values the
patent at zero) to the patentee can only be characterized as a windfall.
infringe because the base and seat were essentially integral parts of a whole. See Dorel, 2004 WL
2269760 at *4. The Federal Circuit adopted the district court's construction of the claim terms
but did not agree with its conclusion as to infringement. See Dorel, 429 F3d at 1047. According to
the Federal Circuit, if "the top structure is capable of functioning as a 'seat' upon being removed
from the bottom structure," then the car seat would infringe the patent's claims. See id.
99 A critique of the scenario presented by this example revolves around invalidity. If the
claimed feature has been inadvertently adopted by the infringer, but not for its intended purpose
(as had been done in Dorel and the example), then it could be argued that the claim was obvious
and therefore invalid. While Dorel demonstrates that reaching this point without succeeding on
an invalidity argument is certainly realistic, the district court's opinion does not make it clear
whether the argument was even advanced. See generally Dorel, 2004 WL 2269760.
100 35 USC § 284.
101 Consider Monitor Patriot Co v Roy, 401 US 265,275 (1971) ("The reasonable-man stan-
dard of liability, for example, serves admirably the essential function of imposing an objective
and socially acceptable limit on the freedom of an individual to act with relation to others.").
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The patentee has not been injured, and the infringer has gained no val-
ue by infringing since she could have achieved the same end product
through noninfringing technology at no additional cost. It is difficult to
see how a windfall to the patentee can be characterized as "reasonable."
Awards of zero or nominal damages are entirely unremarkable
elsewhere in the law where there is no actual injury. Following a find-
ing of trademark infringement, a plaintiff is entitled to recover dam-
ages for provable injuries and may also recover a defendant's profits.10
However, the defendant's profits are not recoverable if "the defendant
can show that the infringement had no relationship to those earn-
ings."03 If the plaintiff in a trademark infringement case has no prova-
ble injuries and the infringement did not contribute to the defendant's
profits, the plaintiff recovers nothing. ° Trademark law, therefore, is
entirely unapologetic about the prospect of no recovery even given a
finding of liability when the plaintiff has not been injured and the de-
fendant has not been enriched. Nominal damages may also be all that
are recoverable in contract 5 and tort °6 law in spite of a finding of lia-
bility. Even in the case of trespass to real property, intentional but
harmless intrusions may lead to recovery of only nominal damages.
'17
The Supreme Court's pre-Georgia-Pacific cases also support the
possibility of zero-damage reasonable royalty awards. In Aro, the
court suggested that damages should be tied to "the difference between
[a patentee's] pecuniary condition after the infringement, and what his
condition would have been if the infringement had not occurred."1' If
low-cost, noninfringing alternatives could have substituted for the in-
102 See 15 USC § 1117 (2000 & Supp 2004).
103 George Basch Co, Inc v Blue Coral, Inc, 968 F2d 1532, 1539 (2d Cir 1992).
104 See, for example, The Belmonts v DiMucci, 1996 WL 280473 (2d Cir) (affirming a jury
award of nominal damages of $1 for trademark infringement); Downtowner/Passport Interna-
tional Hotel Corp v Norlew, Inc, 841 F2d 214,220 (8th Cir 1988) (finding trademark infringement
under the Lanham Act and remanding for entry of nominal damages because "any award greater
than nominal damages would be based on sheer speculation").
105 See, for example, Shepard v State Auto Mutual Insurance Co, 463 F3d 742, 748 (7th Cir
2006); McClaran v Plastic Industries, Inc, 97 F3d 347, 357 (9th Cir 1996).
106 See, for example, Boule v Hutton, 328 F3d 84, 94-95 (2d Cir 2003) (affirming a nominal
damage award for defamation); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 569, comment c (1965) (noting
that in defamation cases, even without proof of harm, "nominal damages ... perform a vindicato-
ry function by enabling the plaintiff publicly to brand the defamatory function as false"). See
generally Restatement (Second) of Torts § 907.
107 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 163, Reporter's Notes. The analogy between patents
and real property has linguistic support. Patent law borrows its terminology from real property
law-to this day, the Federal Circuit refers to the patent examination process as a progression
"toward defining the metes and bounds of the invention to be patented." In re Buszard, 504 F3d
1364,1367 (Fed Cir 2007) (emphasis added).
108 Aro,377 US at 507, quoting Yale Lock Manufacturing Co v Sargent, 117 US 536,552 (1886).
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fringer's use of the patented invention, the patentee's "pecuniary con-
dition" would be the same with or without the infringement.
C. Litigation and Settlement with or without Grain Processing
Where a party's product falls under the claims of another's patent
and a noninfringing alternative is not available, the patentee's source
of leverage in a pre-suit negotiation comes from two sources: (1) the
likelihood of obtaining damages in the form of a reasonable royalty;
and (2) the likelihood of obtaining an injunction. If the infringer wishes
to continue producing the product and a suit is brought by the patentee,
the amount of any settlement reached will reflect both the possible rea-
sonable royalty damages for the prior period of infringement, as well
as a future royalty to avoid the injunction and compensate the paten-
tee for future use.
For infringers like Company A in the example-those who could
have adopted a noninfringing alternative had they known of the pa-
tent"° -the patentee's leverage is decidedly different. The infringer
does not want a license for future use of the product, preferring in-
stead to adopt the noninfringing alternative. It only wants to avoid an
injunction to the extent necessary to recover sunk costs "° and any
costs of switching to the noninfringing alternative."' In the setting of
the example, Company A has sunk costs in the design of its car seat -
the manufacturing process of the base and seat as separate pieces and
the production of existing units. While a noninfringing alternative (us-
ing a rivet as opposed to a screw) may have essentially zero extra cost,
Company A's sunk costs and the capital expenditures required to alter
its manuf--turing, process mean it cannot immediately and costlesslv
adopt the noninfringing alternative.
At this point, the choice of whether or not to strictly apply Grain
Processing has a significant impact on the negotiations between these
parties. If the parties expect courts to allow consideration of all Geor-
gia-Pacific factors even in the presence of noninfringing alternatives
(as suggested by Micro Chemical), the patentee can extract at least the
sunk costs, and likely much more, from the infringer. The measurable
value of the patentee's intellectual property is now the original value
of the patent plus this potential damage award. The increase in value
109 Even if Company A knew of the patent, it may well have reasonably thought that its
product would not be found to infringe.
110 Sunk costs are "the acquisition costs of tangible and intangible assets that cannot be
recovered through the redeployment of these assets outside the relevant market." US DOJ and
FTC, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed Reg 41552,41556.
111 Note that these latter costs are distinct from the per-unit cost difference (if any) between
the infringing product and the noninfringing alternative.
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comes only from the threat of a nonzero reasonable royalty damage
award-a windfall to the patentee because this value does not arise
from the patent's independent economic value. However, if courts
instead strictly apply Grain Processing's reasoning, a suit by the paten-
tee would at most result in an injunction. The patentee would have to
balance the costs of litigation against the value of this injunction,
which may be significantly limited where the infringer is not a compet-
itor. Avoiding this injunction may be of some value to the infringer;
but if the infringer does not compete with the patentee and would
simply switch to a noninfringing alternative, the injunction offers little
economic benefit to the patentee.
D. Meeting Criticism of the Grain Processing Approach
Criticism of the Grain Processing approach tracks the commen-
tary noted in Part II.C-following Grain Processing underdeters
harmful conduct and allows infringers a free pass to infringe. Com-
mentators have criticized proposed patent legislation on a similar ba-
sis, arguing that it will undermine patentee rights." For example, Ri-
chard Epstein argues that the proposed legislation weakens patent
damage remedies when it "instructs courts to exclude from the dam-
age calculations any economic value properly attributable to other
patented or nonpatented improvements. '1 3 A court applying Grain
Processing's reasoning would raise the same concern-the court ex-
cludes the entire economic value of the patent except for any cost sav-
ings over an available noninfringing alternative. Such critics are espe-
cially concerned about the aftermath of MercExchange, LLC v eBay,
Inc"' and the decreased availability of injunctions-in the absence of
an injunction, the possibility of a significant damage award is all that
remains to deter infringement. "5
112 See, for example, Stephen Haber, Scott Kieff, and Troy Paredes, Patent Reform Legisla-
tion: No Final Cut for Examiners, Nati L J *1 (May 14,2007), online at http:/Iaw.wustl.edu/faculty/
documents/kiefflOtherpubs/HaberKieffParedesonPatentReforminNLJ.pdf (visited Aug 29, 2008)
("The power of patents to spur innovation and its commercialization is blunted when patentees
cannot exclude infringers."); E Scott Kieff, A Keirestu Approach to Patents, Intellectual Asset Man-
agement 51, 52 (Feb/Mar 2007), online at http:/Iaw.wustl.edu/faculty/documentslkiefflOtherpubs/
KieffKeirestuApproachtoPatentsinlAM.pdf (visited Aug 29, 2008) (arguing that proposed patent
reforms will undermine inventors' incentives by weakening their "right to exclude").
113 Richard Epstein, A Dangerous One-Two Punch, Financial Times 1 (Oct 24,2007).
114 547 US 388 (2006).
115 See Epstein, Financial Times at 1 (cited in note 113) ("Now that trial courts have given
broader discretion in opening or shutting the injunction door, damage calculations loom ever larger.").
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1. Reasonable royalties should not function as punitive damages.
Opponents of Grain Processing maintain that social harm arises
from the infringement, even without provable damages or benefits
obtained by the infringer. In the example, this reasoning justifies a
nonzero reasonable royalty as a sort of punitive damages. At least a
kernel of a punitive damages concept already appears in patent law
through the treble damages enhancement for willful infringement.
This damage enhancement, however, does not function like punitive
damages in tort, and this does not appear to be what Congress in-
tended when it allowed additional recoveries in patent cases. Unlike
punitive damage doctrines, the patent statute has a cap on recovery -
up to three times the amount of damages found by the court. "6 There
is no analogous fixed cap in tort law.
By capping recovery at a low multiple of either the provable
damages or a reasonable royalty, the patent statute suggests that other
social harms are not meant to be addressed through recovery of pa-
tent damages. The Federal Circuit has offered support for this pers-
pective: "Under our cases, enhanced damages may be awarded only as
a penalty for an infringer's increased culpability, namely willful in-
fringement or bad faith. Damages cannot be enhanced to award the
patentee additional compensation to rectify what the district court
views as an inadequacy in the actual damages awarded."'
2. Lingering concerns about willful infringement.
Grain Processing critics may still be concerned about adequate
deterrence of willful infringement, especially because the difference
between nominal damages and a trebled nominal damage award is
itself nominal. A potential infringer with knowledge of the patent (a
potential willful infringer) who truly has a noninfringing alternative
available at minimal cost is unlikely to adopt the infringing option, as
the costs of litigation remain a deterrent. Under the Grain Processing
rule, the patentee might be less likely to file suit as damages would be
more difficult to recover; however, if a suit is filed, the infringer must
establish that the noninfringing alternative is both acceptable and
available. A willful infringer may have difficulty justifying the selec-
tion of the infringing technology over the noninfringing alternative.
Accordingly, a finding of willful infringement may in itself imply
that no noninfringing alternatives were actually available at any compa-
116 See 35 USC § 284.
117 Beatrice Foods Co v New England Printing and Lithographing Co, 923 F2d 1576, 1579
(Fed Cir 1991).
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rable cost to the infringing technology-otherwise, the infringer would
not have chosen to infringe. This conclusion, however, is not immediate.
Consider the view of a patent as a probabilistic right, ultimately tested
only through litigation."8 From this perspective, knowledge of the patent
corresponds only to a probability of its validity and enforceability.
These probabilities determine the costs of pursuing the patented option
for the potential infringer. "9 A failure to switch to a noninfringing alter-
native after acquiring knowledge of the patent may be explained by
sunk costs, even if such an act would constitute willful infringement.
Regardless of changes in the doctrine of willful infringement (due
to the In re Seagate decision and possible patent reform legislation),
application of Grain Processing in settings like that of the example
seems to create a willful infringement problem. If the patentee has
insufficient incentives to file suit (either because no significant dam-
age award can be expected or an injunction has low value against a
non-competitor that can adopt an alternative), the infringer may con-
tinue to infringe the patent indefinitely. Whether this constitutes a
social harm of concern to the patent system is open to policy debate;
but absent willful infringement, Grain Processing cases suggest a legal
resolution to the treatment of noninfringing alternatives in reasonable
royalty calculations.
CONCLUSION
When noninfringing alternatives are available, zero (or nominal)
reasonable royalty awards in patent infringement suits are supported
by the patent statutes and by Federal Circuit jurisprudence. The impli-
cations of the economic approach of Grain Processing are clear for
reasonable royalty cases, yet the Federal Circuit has proved reluctant
to follow the implications of that decision. As a result, district courts
are left to compute reasonable royalties under Georgia-Pacific that
can result in inefficient transfers from patentees to inadvertent infring-
ers who get no value from the patented technologies. As a response to
the growing support for remedying the excesses of the patent system,
particularly with respect to overvalued patents, an embrace of Grain
Processing by the Federal Circuit or Supreme Court would provide a
narrowly tailored but significant curtailment of over-recovery.
118 See Lemley and Shapiro, 85 Tex L Rev at 2019 (cited in note 5) (noting that "nearly half
of all litigated patents are invalidated").
119 If adopting a noninfringing alternative costs $100 more than the patented technology, a
willfulness-enhanced reasonable royalty award would be capped at $300. If the perceived probabilis-
tic value of the patent is less than 33 percent, the rational potential infringer would choose to infringe.
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